McMaster’s memoir reveals differences between Moon, Trump administrations over N. Korea, other issues

That difference of opinion about what drove the North Korean leader was bound to create tension and disagreement, the former White House official recalled.

In the process of agreeing on a joint summit statement, he said Seoul and Washington struggled to bridge their differences.

“Our South Korean counterparts insisted on language that held out the prospect of negotiation with North Korea at some point and an acknowledgement that Seoul would take the lead role in any effort to talk with the North Korean regime,” he said.

“In turn, Pottinger, Hooker and I insisted on language emphasizing sanctions enforcement as essential for convincing Kim Jong-un that denuclearization was in his best interest.”

He was referring to Matthew Pottinger and Allison Hooker who formerly served as principal deputy national security advisor and senior director for Asia, respectively.

He also mentioned difference between himself and then South Korean counterpart, Chung Eui-yong, over how to characterize North Korea’s launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on July 4, 2017.

“(Chung) told me that the Moon government was not ready to call the missile an ICBM,” he said. “I responded, ‘Eui-yong, just because you don’t call it an ICBM doesn’t mean it’s not an ICBM.'”

With Moon deeply committed to inter-Korean rapprochement, his administration appeared cautious about the characterization of a North Korean ICBM launch apparently on concern that a public accusation of North Korea could hurt diplomacy with Pyongyang.

McMaster unveiled some of the allies’ discussions over the installation of a U.S. THAAD missile defense battery as well.

The THAAD system was installed in Seongju, 214 kilometers southeast of Seoul, in 2017, but held the status of a “temporary” installation for years due to an environmental impact assessment requirement.

Before the summit between Moon and Trump in June 2017, McMaster warned Chung about Trump’s aversion to environmental assessments.

“Please tell President Moon not to repeat his recent statement that the THAAD deployment would depend on an environmental assessment,” he said. “Trump is already not a fan of THAAD, and as a real estate developer, he really hates environmental assessments.”

McMaster also said that Trump “harrumphed, vociferating about how environmental assessments are a waste of time,” when Moon noted the need for an assessment although he indicated he was okay with the THAAD deployment.

The former White House official shed some light on internal U.S. discussions about how to approach the North Korean nuclear quandary when Trump was in office.

What was notable was that there were some government officials whom he said argued that “the least risky and least costly course of action would be to accept North Korea as a nuclear power and then deter its use of nuclear weapons.”

McMaster said that he, along with Pottinger and Hooker, believed the idea that Pyongyang wanted nuclear weapons only for deterrence was “wrong.”

“Kim, we thought, really wanted to reunify the peninsula under Pyongyang’s control,” he said.

He also recalled that Trump enjoyed North Korea-related discussions at the White House, especially if they entailed the conventional wisdom of the “stupid people” who had preceded him.

He said that Pottinger showed to Trump a timeline with photos to illustrate the historical pattern of efforts to denuclearize North Korea. And then, the contours of a “maximum pressure” strategy on the North came into view, he said.

“Trump directed us to ‘fully isolate North Korea’ and to make Chinese leader Xi Jinping ‘pay a price for backing Kim Jong-un,'” he said.

Moreover, McMaster said that he and other colleagues had come up with the three “don’ts” when it came to North Korea — guidelines that Trump agreed on.

The first one was not to rush to the negotiating table or acceding to weak initial agreements just to talk with North Korea, while the second one was not to view diplomacy and the development of military options as separate and sequential efforts. The last one was not to lift sanctions prematurely to reward the North just for talking.

McMaster, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general, left the Trump administration in March 2018 after alleged friction with Trump over policy issues.

sshluck@yna.co.kr
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