U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s late March visit to Manila – his first since assuming office – has elicited firm opposition from China, leading Beijing to express strong diplomatic and military concerns. Despite Hegseth’s assurances during his Asia-Pacific tour – which also took him to Guam and Japan – that the United States “does not seek war, but peace” and his stated goal of bolstering alliances toward a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, China is unconvinced.
China’s Ministry of National Defense explicitly characterized increased Philippine-U.S. military cooperation as “aggravating regional tensions,” warning that China would take necessary measures to safeguard its sovereignty and security interests. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized the intensified Philippines-U.S. military relationship, warning that such actions significantly heighten regional tensions and undermine stability in the South China Sea.
Beijing’s core concerns specifically focus on the deepening Philippines-U.S. military cooperation, which includes increasingly practical and combat-oriented joint military exercises, enhanced arms sales, and strategic military deployments. China views these developments as a direct security challenge, not only in the South China Sea but also vividly affecting stability across the Taiwan Strait.
The Trump administration’s second-term Indo-Pacific strategy was initially perceived by some in Beijing as potentially moderate, as President Donald Trump is a deal-maker. Yet the Trump administration’s approach is now viewed in China as unequivocally confrontational. Consequently, China anticipates a more contentious diplomatic relationship with the United States, alongside increased military preparations to face potential security incidents or clashes involving U.S. forces in the region.
Scenarios Raising China’s Alert Level
The enhanced practicality of joint military exercises has become a prominent trend since 2024. Philippines-U.S. joint drills, such as the annual Balikatan exercises, have significantly intensified, shifting toward high-intensity combat scenarios involving island seizure and anti-amphibious operations.
A notable escalation occurred in 2025 when the U.S. deployed the advanced Naval/Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) and unmanned surface vessels within Philippine territory, greatly enhancing the alliance’s coastal strike capabilities. These deployments explicitly counter China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, aligning directly with new U.S. Marine Corps doctrines like Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and “stand-in forces.” Such moves signal to Beijing a profound shift from mere deterrence toward active preparations for potential conflict scenarios.
Japan’s formal entry into minilateral military drills represents a particularly alarming signal for China. For the first time, Japan will officially participate as a troop contributor – not merely an observer – in the upcoming 2025 Balikatan exercise, involving around 15,000 personnel from the U.S., the Philippines, and Australia. Japan’s inclusion marks a significant shift toward institutionalizing Japan-Philippines-U.S. trilateral security cooperation. Beijing sees this as clear evidence that the Trump administration is not just reinforcing bilateral alliances but actively forming a broader minilateral security coalition aimed at containing Chinese influence in both Northeast and Southeast Asia.
In addition, upgraded U.S. arms sales and strategic support to Manila are taking a significant step forward. In April 2025, the United States approved a $5.58 billion arms package, providing up to 20 advanced F-16 Block 70/72 fighter jets to the Philippines. These sophisticated aircraft substantially bolster Manila’s maritime surveillance, precision strike, and anti-access capabilities, especially through anti-ship missile integration. The United States has also transferred advanced unmanned systems – including surface vessels deployed in recent exercises – and announced plans to supply MQ-9B Reaper drones, further enhancing Philippine intelligence and surveillance capabilities. Beijing views this substantial escalation in arms support as a calculated effort to establish a “proxy deterrence” aimed explicitly at constraining China’s maritime activities.
The explicit incorporation of Taiwan Strait scenarios into military exercises represents a critical turning point in Philippines-U.S. defense cooperation. In early 2025, Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Romeo Brawner publicly acknowledged that Manila would be “inevitably drawn in” should a conflict occur across the Taiwan Strait, explicitly instructing Philippine forces in Northern Luzon to prepare accordingly. The Balikatan 2025 exercises specifically incorporate scenarios simulating cross-strait conflict, confirming to Beijing that Manila’s security alignment now directly implicates it in Taiwan’s geopolitical tensions – an unprecedented and deeply concerning development.
A strategic emphasis on Northern Luzon for forward deployment is a hallmark of the United States’ strategic reorientation, with three of the four new EDCA military sites established close to Taiwan and the fourth positioned in Palawan, directly facing the disputed Spratly Islands. These bases substantially enhance the U.S. capability to project force near crucial maritime chokepoints, particularly the strategically important Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines. The deployment of missile systems and intensified joint military exercises in areas like the Batanes Islands have further reinforced Beijing’s perception that the Philippines-U.S. military alignment explicitly targets China’s maritime access and strategic maneuverability.
Lastly, the persistent high-frequency presence of the U.S. military in the South China Sea further intensifies Beijing’s strategic concerns. In 2024 alone, large reconnaissance aircraft conducted about 1,000 missions near Chinese territory, and ocean surveillance and measurement vessels accumulated 706 ship days of activity, marking a significant increase compared to 2023, according to a report published by the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative, a prominent Chinese thinktank. Additionally, three carrier strike groups – USS Carl Vinson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Abraham Lincoln – undertook eight patrols, and nuclear submarines maintained regular operations. U.S. Air Force strategic bomber missions nearly doubled, with 56 sorties involving B-52H, B-1B, and B-2A aircraft, underscoring a heightened operational tempo.
This military activity conveys a “quasi-deployed” U.S. posture near China’s maritime periphery, signaling not just deterrence but active encirclement from Beijing’s perspective.
China’s Potential Response: Targeting Washington, Not Manila
In formulating its strategic response to the strengthened Philippines-U.S. security partnership under Trump’s renewed Indo-Pacific strategy, China will likely shift its diplomatic and strategic pressure toward Washington rather than directly confronting Manila.
During the first Trump presidency and later under Biden, China predominantly criticized Manila’s South China Sea policy and exercised restraint toward confrontation with the United States to avoid military escalation. However, China’s recent approach to the intensifying U.S.-initiated trade war signals a notable shift toward reciprocity, matching U.S. measures with proportional countermeasures. If Beijing applies a similar “tit-for-tat” strategy in managing security tensions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, it would inevitably involve a more direct strategic contest with Washington, consistent with concerns expressed by some U.S. policymakers and analysts.
Furthermore, recent developments suggest Beijing is adopting a more nuanced approach toward Manila. At the latest high-level Chinese political meeting focused on “building a community with a shared future with neighboring countries,” all seven members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee attended, underscoring the increased significance Beijing now places on regional diplomacy amid heightened tensions with Washington. The meeting notably defined neighborhood diplomacy as “a priority area in China’s overall diplomacy.” It emphasized that China’s relations with its neighbors are “currently at their best in modern times.” Within this context, Beijing understands that overtly punishing Manila for its security cooperation with Washington risks alienating other Southeast Asian nations and undermining China’s carefully constructed goodwill in the Global South.
Ultimately, Beijing’s approach will carefully balance deterrence and diplomacy, clearly signaling that its strategic objections are directed toward the Trump administration’s policies, not the Philippines as a sovereign nation. This strategy is designed to preserve regional goodwill, avoid unnecessary friction with neighbors, and reinforce China’s longstanding diplomatic engagement with developing countries, ensuring broad international backing amid intensifying geopolitical rivalry.
